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The inability to see and quantify systemic financial risk comes at an immense social cost. Systemic
risk in the financial system arises to a large extent as a consequence of the interconnectedness of
its institutions, which are linked through networks of different types of financial contracts, such as
credit, derivatives, foreign exchange and securities. The interplay of the various exposure networks
can be represented as layers in a financial multi-layer network. In this work we quantify the daily
contributions to systemic risk from four layers of the Mexican banking system from 2007-2013.
We show that focusing on a single layer underestimates the total systemic risk by up to 90%. By
assigning systemic risk levels to individual banks we study the systemic risk profile of the Mexican
banking system on all market layers. This profile can be used to quantify systemic risk on a national
level in terms of nation-wide expected systemic losses. We show that market-based systemic risk
indicators systematically underestimate expected systemic losses. We find that expected systemic
losses are up to a factor four higher now than before the financial crisis of 2007-2008. We find
that systemic risk contributions of individual transactions can be up to a factor of thousand higher
than the corresponding credit risk, which creates huge risks for the public. We find an intriguing
non-linear effect whereby the sum of systemic risk of all layers underestimates the total risk. The
method presented here is the first objective data driven quantification of systemic risk on national
scales that reveal its true levels.
Keywords: multiplex networks, quantitative social science, risk propagation, cascading failure, systemic risk
mitigation, financial regulation
I. INTRODUCTION
Systemic risk (SR) in financial markets is the risk that
a significant fraction of the financial system can no longer
perform its function as a credit provider and collapses.
In a more narrow sense, SR is a notion of contagion or
impact that starts from the failure of a financial institu-
tion (or a group of institutions) and propagates through
the financial system, and potentially to the real econ-
omy [1, 2]. Systemic risk in financial markets gener-
ally emerges through two mechanisms, either through
the synchronization of behavior of agents (fire sales, mar-
gin calls, herding), or through the interconnectedness of
agents. The former can be measured by a potential cap-
ital shortfall during periods of synchronized behavior,
where many institutions are simultaneously distressed [3–
6]. The latter is a consequence of the network nature of
financial claims and liabilities [7, 8]. Network-based SR
is potentially extremely harmful because of the possibil-
ity of cascading failure, meaning that the default of a
financial agent may trigger defaults of others. Secondary
defaults might cause avalanches of defaults percolating
∗ stefan.thurner@meduniwien.ac.at
throughout the entire network and can potentially wipe
out the financial system by a de-leveraging cascade [9–
17]. The fear of cascading failure is generally believed
to be the reason why institutions under distress are often
bailed out at tremendous public costs [18]. On the regula-
tors’ side, in response to the financial crisis of 2007-2008,
broader attention is now directed to SR. A consensus for
the need for new financial regulation – including a po-
tential re-design of the financial world – is emerging [19].
In the currently discussed regulation framework of Basel
III the importance of networks is recognized [2, 20].
These developments have spurred research on SR and
financial networks. It has been shown that the topology
of financial networks can be associated with probabili-
ties for systemic collapse [21, 22]. In particular, network
centrality measures have been identified as appropriate
measures to quantify SR by various groups [8, 23–28]. A
disadvantage of centrality measures is that the SR value
for a particular node has no clear interpretation as a mea-
sure for expected losses in the case of a cascading failure
event. A variant of a centrality measure that solves this
problem is the so-called DebtRank, which is a recursive
method to quantify the systemic relevance of financial
nodes in terms of losses Battiston et al. [29]. This im-
provement, achieved by the DebtRank, has inspired re-
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2cent work on financial SR, involving real data [30] and
agent based models [28].
Despite the tremendous importance of SR and the re-
search efforts devoted to the topic, so far there are no
reliable quantitative indices that quantify SR on a na-
tional and temporal basis. Indices that have sometimes
been used to estimate SR in markets – such as volatility
indices (such as VIX), or spreads of credit default swaps
(such as CDX) – are poor proxies because they are clearly
incapable of taking cascading defaults into account. As a
consequence these proxies greatly underestimate the true
levels of SR in economies.
In this work we develop a number of potentially prac-
tical methods to quantify SR in financial multi-layer net-
works. First, we extend the notion of systemic impor-
tance in financial network to multi-layer networks. This
makes it possible to assess SR contributions from vari-
ous layers of financial networks. Second, we develop a
risk measure to quantify the expected loss due to SR,
that takes cascading into account by explicit use of the
financial network topologies on a daily scale. This risk
measure extends the notion of systemic importance to
a national level and allows us to compare SR levels of
economies over time, and to identify trends and histori-
cal events. In this sense the measure can be used as an
indicator or a SR index. In particular it becomes pos-
sible to compare SR levels and their related potential
costs, before and after the recent crisis. Third, building
on the work of Poledna and Thurner [30], we use the risk
measure to quantify the marginal contribution of indi-
vidual exposures in financial networks to the overall SR.
This allows us to extend the notion of systemic impor-
tance from financial institutions to individual exposures.
In particular it allows us to quantify the expected loss
due to SR associated with every individual exposure of
financial institutions.
This work is based on a unique data set containing var-
ious types of daily exposures between the mayor Mexi-
can financial intermediaries (banks) over the period 2004-
2013 (for this work we use data from 2007-2013). Data
is collected and owned by the Banco de Me´xico and has
been extensively studied under various aspects [31–33].
Here we focus on banks that interact simultaneously in
four different markets, generating four different types of
exposures: (unsecured) interbank credit, securities, for-
eign exchange and derivative markets. Hence, institu-
tions are connected by contracts of four different types.
Different contract types can be seen as distinct network
layers. A collection of various networks linking the same
set of nodes is called a multi-layer or multiplex network.
The interplay of the various exposure networks can be
represented as layers in a financial multi-layer network.
The data further contains the capitalization of banks for
every month. With this data we quantify the SR contri-
butions of the individual layers and estimate the mutual
influence of one layer of exposures on the others.
We obtain a series of practically relevant results. First,
we show that focusing on a single exposure layer individ-
ually underestimates the total SR by up to 90%. When
focusing on all the layers, we find an intriguing non-linear
effect that the sum of SR from all layers underestimates
the total SR. Second, we show that market-based SR in-
dicators systematically underestimate expected systemic
losses. Third, we find that current expected systemic
losses are up to a factor four higher now than they were
before the financial crisis of 2007-2008. Fourth, we find
that SR contributions of individual transactions can be
up to a hundred times higher than the corresponding
credit risk, which creates huge risks for the public.
The method presented here is the first objective, data
driven quantification of SR on national scales that reveals
its true levels on a temporal basis.
II. RELATED LITERATURE
Our work contributes to existing literature on SR and
financial multi-layer networks. In recent years, several
contributions to the statistical understanding of multi-
layer networks and their dynamics have appeared in a
broad and general context [34–36]. Especially the use of
network similarity measures, node- and link correlations,
and link-overlap measures have turned out to be useful
tools to identify and quantify interactions between layers
[34–36]. The various layers of a financial multi-layer net-
work consist of credit (borrowing-lending relationships,
consisting of counterparty exposures and implicit rela-
tionships, such as roll-over of overnight loans), insurance
(derivative) contracts, collateral obligations, market im-
pact of overlapping asset portfolios and the network of
cross-holdings (holding of securities or stocks of other
banks). Research on financial networks has mainly fo-
cused on a single layer; mostly, on direct lending net-
works between financial institutions [8, 37–44], but also
on the network of derivative exposures [24, 45], and on
the network of common asset exposures [46].
Research on financial multi-layer networks has only
appeared recently. Leo´n et al. [47] study the interactions
of financial institutions on different financial markets in
Colombia. Bargigli et al. [48] study the interaction in the
Italian interbank market between financial network layers
of short- and long-term bilateral lending, both secured
and unsecured. Bargigli et al. [48] and Leo´n et al. [47]
are however not directly concerned with measuring SR.
Bluhm et al. [49] consider an agent-based model of
a multi-layer interbank network, incorporating different
contagion channels – that is, from common asset expo-
sure, direct lending exposures and fire sales. They are
not concerned with the interaction between the individ-
ual layers. On the other hand, Montagna and Kok [50]
do consider the contribution of individual contagion lay-
ers to SR. Their agent-based model consists of three lay-
ers: long-term direct lending exposures, short-term direct
lending exposures, and common asset exposures. Cal-
ibrating the model on end-of-2011 balance sheet data
from 50 European banks, they obtain a similar result
3to us, namely that SR measured on the combined multi-
layer network can be much larger than the aggregate SR
from the individual network layers. However, Montagna
and Kok [50] do not have actual bilateral network data
at their disposal; instead, they consider the multi-layer
network structure as a free parameter in their calibra-
tion exercises, and SR depends on the network structure
considered. By using daily data on the exact bilateral ex-
posures between banks in the Mexican financial network,
our work, however, does not allow for this freedom. The
use of high frequency longitudinal data allows a detailed
analysis of the fluctuations of different SR contributions
over time. Furthermore, Montagna and Kok [50] do not
consider exposures from derivatives, cross-holdings of se-
curities and FX transactions, which in the Mexican data
set turn out to be the dominant exposures, much more
relevant than short-term or long-term unsecured deposits
and loans. Moreover, whereas Montagna and Kok [50]
consider as systemic risk measure the number of failing
banks in a default cascade, we consider a systemic risk
measure based on DebtRank, which allows for a simple
interpretation of SR in terms of expected losses, and a
simple comparison to market-based systemic risk mea-
sures. Thus, the availability of more granular and exten-
sive data allows us to take the analysis of Montagna and
Kok [50] a considerable step further.
In this context several risk measures for SR have been
proposed that focus (mainly) on statistics of losses, ac-
companied by a potential shortfall during periods of syn-
chronized behavior, where many institutions are simul-
taneously distressed [3–6]. In particular, four statistical
measures have been proposed recently: conditional value-
at-risk (CoVaR), systemic expected shortfall (SES), sys-
temic risk indices (SRISK) and distressed insurance pre-
mium (DIP). CoVaR is defined as the value at risk (VaR)
of the financial system, conditional on institutions being
in distress. The contribution to SR of an institution is
the difference between CoVaR, conditional on the insti-
tution being in distress, and CoVaR in its median state
[3]. SES measures the propensity to be undercapital-
ized, given that the system as a whole is undercapitalized
[4]. SES is related to leverage and the marginal expected
shortfall (MES). SRISK is closely related to SES and as
such, a function of the size of an institution, its degree
of leverage, and its MES [5]. DIP measures the price of
insurance against systemic financial distress in the bank-
ing system and is closely related to the expected shortfall
[6]. None of these measures take cascading defaults into
account.
III. QUANTIFICATION OF SYSTEMIC RISK
IN MULTI-LAYER NETWORKS
A. The financial multi-layer network – different
exposure types
Banks interact in different markets and generate dif-
ferent types of exposures. Banks issue securities that
are later bought by other banks. By holding these se-
curities, banks expose themselves to other banks. For-
eign exchange transactions can lead to large exposures
between banks. Their exposures are associated with set-
tlement risk. Another market activity that can lead to
considerable exposures is trading in financial derivatives.
We analyze four different types (α = 1, 2, 3, 4) of fi-
nancial exposures: ‘derivatives’, ‘securities’, ‘foreign ex-
change’ and ‘deposits & loans’. In section IV we explain
in detail how the exposure types are obtained from the
Mexican data set. We use the following notation for dif-
ferent exposure types: The size of every exposure of type
α of institution i to institution j at time t is given by
the matrix element Lαij(t). α = 1, 2, 3, 4 labels the layers
‘derivatives’, ‘securities’, ‘foreign exchange’ and ‘deposits
& loans’, respectively. We use the convention to write li-
abilities in the rows (second index) of matrix L, so that
the entries Lαij(t) at a given day t are the liabilities bank
i has towards bank j. If the matrix is read column-wise
(transpose of L) we get the assets or exposures of banks.
Although the layers considered in this paper arise from
different types of financial risk, the links between nodes
in all the layers have the same meaning as the total loss
that might arise for an institution, as the consequence
of the default of another. The concept and dimension
(dollars) of exposure is the same for all links in all lay-
ers: it is the total loss that one institution would suffer
if a given counterparty defaulted (in any given layer), for
details see section IV.
B. DebtRank – quantification of systemic risk at
the institutional level
DebtRank was originally suggested as a recursive
method to determine the systemic relevance of nodes
within financial networks [29]. It is a quantity that mea-
sures the fraction of the total economic value V in the
network that is potentially affected by the distress of an
individual node i, or by a set of nodes S. For details
see appendix C. The DebtRank of a set of nodes S that
is initially in distress is denoted by RS . In those cases
where only one node i is initially under distress (the set
S contains only one node i) we denote the Debt Rank of
that node by Ri.
DebtRank values can be computed for each layer of a
multi-layer network, Lαij separately. For DebtRanks of
layer α, Rαi , Lij in eq. (C1) is simply replaced by L
α
ij .
The economic value at each layer, that is necessary for
the computation of Rαi , is given by v
α
i = L
α
i /
∑
j L
α
j ,
4where Lαi =
∑
j L
α
ji. For a multi-layer network, Deb-
tRank can be calculated from the combined liability net-
work Lcombij =
∑
α L
α
ij . We refer to the DebtRank of
the combined liability network as Rcombi and the total
economic value V comb =
∑
i L
comb
i is given by total in-
terbank assets in all layers combined, see eq. (C2).
To allow a comparison of Rαi between different lay-
ers, Rαi must be shown as a percentage of the total eco-
nomic value V comb of interbank assets in all layers com-
bined (eq. (C2)). The normalized DebtRank for layer α
is therefore defined as
Rˆαi =
V α
V comb
Rαi , (1)
where V α =
∑
i L
α
i is the total economic value of the
interbank assets in the layer α.
C. Quantification of systemic risk at the country
level
We define the SR-profile of a country at time t as the
rank-ordered normalized DebtRank values Rˆαi for all fi-
nancial institutions in a country. The SR-profile shows
the distribution of systemic impact across institutions
throughout a country. The institution with the highest
SR level is to the very left. We denote the number of
institutions in a country by b. It is natural to define the
average DebtRank as a quantity that captures the SR of
the entire economy (with b institutions) at a given time,
R¯α(t) =
1
b
b∑
i=1
Rˆαi (t) . (2)
For the combined network, Rˆαi is replaced by R
comb
i , and
we write R¯comb(t) for the combined average DebtRank.
Note that R¯α(t) depends on the network topology of the
various layers (or the combined network) only, and is
independent of default probabilities, recovery rates, or
other variables.
The precise meaning of the DebtRank as the fraction
of the total economic value in a network allows us to
define the expected systemic loss for the entire economy,
which is the size of the loss, multiplied by the probability
of that loss occurring [30]. To compute the expected sys-
temic loss, we first consider the simple case where only
one institution i can default and all other b − 1 institu-
tions survive. In this case the expected loss is given by
ELsysti (one default) = V ·pi · (1−p1) · . . . · (1−pi−1) · (1−
pi+1)·. . .·(1−pb)·Ri, where pi is the probability of default
of institution i, and (1 − pj) the survival probability of
j. The general case occurs when we also consider possi-
ble joint defaults, meaning that a set of institutions S go
into distress. Taking into account all possible combina-
tions of defaulting and surviving institutions, we arrive
at a combinatorial expression of the expected loss for an
economy of b institutions
ELsyst = V
∑
S∈P(B)
∏
i∈S
pi
∏
j∈B\S
(1− pj)RS , (3)
where P(B) is the power set of the set of financial insti-
tutions B, and RS is the DebtRank of the set S of nodes
initially in distress. R∅, the DebtRank of the empty set
is defined as zero. The reason being, that by definition
of DebtRank, RS ≤ 1, the value obtained in eq. (3) can-
not exceed the total economic value. Note that the same
arguments apply equally for individual network levels or
the combined multi-layer network, where ELsyst can be
calculated with Rαi or R
comb
i , in combination with the
corresponding economic values eq. (C2).
It is immediately clear that eq. (3) is computationally
feasible only for situations with relative small numbers
of financial institutions. Computing the power set and
calculating DebtRanks for all possible combinations of
large financial networks is unfeasible. In appendix D we
derive a practical approximation for eq. (3),
ELsyst ≈ V
b∑
i=1
piRi . (4)
This approximation is certainly valid if the default proba-
bilities are low (pi  1), or the interconnectedness is low
(Ri ≈ vi). To show that the approximation is extremely
precise as far as realistic scenarios are concerned, we com-
pare the exact result of eq. (3) with the approximation
eq. (4) for an economy of 15 banks in appendix D. Note
that in principle eq. (4) can become larger than V . How-
ever, in appendix D we show that the approximation is
a maximum of 3.5% off the exact value of eq. (3), which
is never larger than V . For larger sets of banks, such as
the Mexican data set, we would run into computational
difficulties in computing the 17 billion odd combinations.
For the remainder we will, therefore, use eq. (4).
D. Quantification of systemic risk of individual
exposures
We estimate the impact of individual daily exposures
on SR. In particular we compare the credit risk (expected
loss) of a single exposure of a given size to its impact on
SR. The expected loss (credit risk) of bank i is
ELcrediti (t) =
b∑
j=1
pj LGDj Lji(t) , (5)
with pj being the default probability as above, LGDj the
loss-given-default of j, and Lji the exposure at default of
i to j. The marginal contribution of an individual expo-
sure, Xkl (matrix with precisely one non-zero element in
line k and row l, quantifying the exposure between banks
k and l) on credit risk, is the increase of credit risk of the
5bank with the additional exposure (risk taken by lender),
∆ELcredit =
∑
i
[
ELcrediti (Lij +Xkl)− ELcrediti (Lij)
]
.
(6)
Here ELcrediti (.) means that EL
credit
i is computed from
the network in the argument.
The impact of individual daily exposures on SR
(marginal contribution), ∆ELsyst has been defined in
Poledna and Thurner [30]. The marginal contribution of
an individual exposure, Xkl (matrix with precisely one
nonzero element for the exposure between k and l) on
ELsyst is the difference of total expected systemic loss,
∆ELsyst =
b∑
i=1
pi [V (Lij +Xkl)Ri(Lij +Xkl, Ci)
−V (Lij)Ri(Lij , Ci)] , (7)
where Ri(Lij+Xkl, Ci) is the DebtRank and V (Lij+Xkl)
the total economic value of the liability network without
the specific exposure Xkl. Clearly, a positive ∆EL
syst
means that Xkl increases total SR. In general, this risk is
borne by the public. If the increase in SR and credit
risk of individual transactions are equal, ∆ELsyst =
∆ELcredit, a default of the exposure would only affect
one of the involved parties (lender), and would not in-
volve any third party. For transactions where ∆ELsyst >
∆ELcredit third parties will also be affected by the de-
fault. The deviation of ∆ELsyst − ∆ELcredit > 0 is a
simple and clear indicator for the existence of an incen-
tive problem, where costs to third parties are generated
by bilateral exposures.
IV. DATA
The data used for this work is derived from a database
on exposures at the Mexican Central Bank, built and
operated with the specific purpose of studying contagion
and SR. This project is maintained by the statistics unit
at the financial stability general directorate at this in-
stitution. The statistics unit under the financial stabil-
ity general directorate at Banco de Mexico gathers infor-
mation and cross-validates it by using daily, weekly and
monthly regulatory reports, which are used for regulatory
and supervisory purposes. An illustrative and important
example is the case of the daily regulatory reports known
as ‘operaciones de captacio´n e interbancarias en moneda
nacional y udis’ (OCIMN), and ‘operaciones de captacio´n
e interbancarias en moneda extranjera’ (OCIME). These
reports contain every single funding transaction on a
daily basis in local and foreign currency, which are used
to compute the daily funding costs for each bank. From
these two regulatory reports it is possible to compute the
exact daily unsecured exposures between banks, as well
as more broadly, those between financial institutions like
investment banks, brokerage houses, mutual funds and
pension funds. In Solorzano-Margain et al. [51], a stress
testing study was carried out using an (extended set) of
these exposures. Given the confidential nature of these
transactions, data is kept under strict access control and
can only be used for regulatory, supervisory and financial
stability purposes.
The present work is based on transaction data that
is converted to bilateral exposures. The four exposure
types are obtained in the following way.
A. Deposits & loans
Daily exposures arise from interbank deposits and
loans in local and foreign currency, and from credit lines
extended for settlement purposes. In the case of deposits
and loans, the calculation of exposures is straightforward.
Maturities and funding risk are not relevant in the con-
text of this paper because we are only concerned with the
quantification of the loss-given-default of a counterparty.
Effects of funding risk and how it propagates among in-
stitutions can be found in Lee [52]. The current expo-
sures Lα=4ij (t) are calculated by adding up all deposits
and loans between bank i and j. As is the case with
most studies, we calculate the gross exposure instead of
net exposure.
B. Securities cross-holdings
Daily exposures also arise from cross-holding of securi-
ties between banks, securities lending, securities that are
used as collateral, and from securities trading. Cross-
holding of securities between banks means that bank j
is holding securities issued by bank i. We again use the
gross exposure, because security contracts must be hon-
ored, even when the counterparty defaults. The daily
cross-holdings gross exposures Lα=2ij (t) are calculated by
adding up all securities cross-holdings that exist between
bank i and j.
C. Derivatives
Daily exposures arise from the valuation of derivatives
transactions, including swaps, forwards, options and repo
transactions. For the derivatives layer, for each type of
derivative contract (swaps, forwards or options) between
any two given banks, the contract is valuated and the
resulting net exposure (at the contract level) is then cal-
culated and assigned to the corresponding bank. Banks
provide the information needed to perform a vanilla
Black Scholes valuation of the derivative contracts. How-
ever, on the intra-month scale, banks themselves valuate
most of the derivative contracts and Banco de Me´xico
verifies the valuation methodologies at each banks’ risk
offices in order to guarantee proper modeling. In con-
trast to securities, exposures from derivatives are netted
6by each type of derivative contract. There are detailed
international agreements on the netting procedure in the
case of failure of a counterparty. This means, for in-
stance, that options with the same underlying security
are added up on each side and the exposures is then
assigned to the counterparty with positive net position.
This process is replicated for each type of derivative with
the same underlying security. The resulting net expo-
sures are then added up to calculate the final exposure
Lα=1ij (t), arising from derivative contracts between bank
i and bank j. In contrast to other, more developed fi-
nancial systems, derivatives in Mexico do not generate
size-able exposures and no exotic derivatives are traded.
Sophisticated derivative strategies are only defined and
executed by the parent banks of the Mexican subsidiaries.
D. Foreign exchange
As far as foreign exchange (FX) transactions are con-
cerned, exposures reflect settlement risk (or Herstatt
risk) – the risk that a counterparty will not pay as obli-
gated at the time of settlement. Mexican banks that are
subsidiaries of internationally active banks are members
of CLS (Continuous Linked Settlement), and are in the
position to settle their FX transactions in a secured way.
However, not all active banks in Mexico are in this situ-
ation and large exposures related to FX transactions do
arise. If banks settle FX transactions between themselves
by using the clearance service provided by CLS – which
eliminates time differences in settlement – there is no ex-
posure. Otherwise the exposure Lα=3ij (t) includes both
foreign currency receivable and foreign currency payable
between bank i and bank j.
Finally, various balance sheet data on the 43 Mexican
banks is also available, such as the capitalization mea-
sured at a monthly scale.
V. RESULTS
A. The financial multi-layer network – the
Mexican banking system
Figure 1 shows the various exposure layers of the Mex-
ican banking network at Sept 30 2013. The derivative
exposure network is seen in the top layer (green), the
second layer shows the exposures from securities cross-
holdings (yellow), the third shows foreign exchange ex-
posures (red). The fourth layer represents the interbank
deposits and loans market (blue). Nodes are shown at
the same position in all layers. Node-size represents the
size of banks’ total assets. Nodes i are colored according
to their systemic impact, as measured by the DebtRank,
Rαi , in the respective layer (see section III B). Systemi-
cally important banks are red, unimportant ones green.
The width of links represents the size of the exposures
in the layer; link-color is the same as the counterparty’s
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R i < .
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FIG. 1. Banking multi-layer network of Mexico on Sept 30
2013. (a) network of exposures from derivatives, (b) securities
cross-holdings, (c) foreign exchange exposures, (d) deposits
and loans and (e) combined banking network Lcombij (t). Nodes
(banks) are colored according to their systemic impact Rαi
in the respective layer (see section III B): from systemically
important banks (red) to systemically safe (green). Node-size
represents banks’ total assets. Link-width is the exposure size
between banks, link-color is taken from the counterparty.
node color (DebtRank). The total exposure in layers
α = 2, 3, 4,
∑
i,j L
α
ij(t) ≈ 5 × 1010 Mex$, is similar in
size. The total exposure of derivatives (α = 1) is smaller,∑
i,j L
1
ij(t) ≈ 1 × 1010 Mex$. However, the number of
links is larger in this layer. Note that the data for deriva-
tive exposures also contains exposures from so-called repo
transactions; the respective amounts are small (less than
2 %) because the repo involves collateral. In fig. 1(e) the
combined exposures Lcombij (t) =
∑4
α=1 L
α
ij(t) are shown.
Classical network statistics for the multi-layer network
are collected and discussed briefly in appendix A.
The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of expo-
sure sizes for the different layers Lαij(t) is presented in
fig. 2. Distributions are obtained by taking all exposures
for every trading day in the observation period. Expo-
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FIG. 2. Cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the ex-
posure sizes (in Mex$) from the different layers, deposits
and loans (DL), foreign exchange exposures (FX), derivatives
(deri) and securities cross-holdings (secu). Data is aggregated
from all days for the entire time span Jan 2 2007 to May 30
2013. Distributions are shifted vertically to avoid overlap-
ping, by factors of 10, 100, and 1000, respectively. Clearly,
the distributions are not power-laws, however for comparison
with previous literature, we report power laws fits (slopes) in
several selected regions of the distributions.
sures from derivative holdings (green) are generally lower
across the entire timespan. Deposits and loans (blue)
are more frequent in small sizes; foreign exchange ex-
posures (red) are typically the largest positions. The
distribution of exposure sizes of securities cross-holdings
(yellow) shows a higher variability for larger sizes com-
pared to other layers. For clarity of the figure, we shifted
the distributions for the deposits and loans, foreign ex-
change exposures, and securities cross-holdings by the
factors 10, 100, and 1000. Clearly, the observed distribu-
tions are neither power laws nor exponential functions.
To formally determine whether the distributions expose
power law tails, we conducted a standard goodness-of-
fit test, which generates a p-value to quantify the plau-
sibility of the hypothesis. We use an approach that
combines a maximum-likelihood fitting method with a
goodness-of-fit test, based on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
statistic and the likelihood ratios developed in Clauset
et al. [53]. The p-values can be interpreted in the usual
way. If p < 0.05, then the null hypothesis is rejected
at the 5%-significance level. In that case there is suffi-
cient statistical evidence that the distribution does not
follow a power law for the identified region. The ap-
propriate tests show the following results for each layer:
Securities (p < 0.001), FX (p < 0.001), deposits & loans
(p ≈ 0.0290) and derivatives (p < 0.001). All p-values
are below the 5%-significance level. In addition, for all
exposure types, we use the goodness-of-fit based method
Jαβ ρ
exp
α,β ρ
liab
α,β ρ
R
α,β
DL:Deri 0.096 0.32∗ 0.20 0.52
DL:Secu 0.081 0.40∗ 0.39 0.63
DL:FX 0.082 0.59∗ 0.16 0.61
Deri:Secu 0.082 0.04∗ 0.73∗ 0.19
Deri:FX 0.190∗ 0.56 0.85∗ 0.63
Secu:FX 0.094 −0.05∗ 0.66∗ 0.25
TABLE I. Values for link-overlap (Jaccard coefficient Jαβ),
and correlations of exposures (defined as
∑
i L
α
ij) ρ
exp
α,β , liabil-
ities (
∑
j L
α
ij) ρ
liab
α,β and DebtRank ρ
R
α,β , between all possible
combinations of two layers α and β, at Sep 30 2013. For the
correlation of DebtRanks, Rαi is calculated for the respective
layers (see section III B). Significant coefficients are marked
with a star.
described in [53] to estimate the regions which can be
fitted by a power. For deposits & loans and derivatives
we find two regions, which can be fitted by a power. The
fitted values for deposits & loans in the identified re-
gions are k1 ≈ −5.28 and k2 ≈ −1.55 and for derivatives
k1 ≈ −7.14 and k2 ≈ −2.06. For the securities layer and
the FX layer we fitted only for one region, the values are
k ≈ −2.31 and k ≈ −1.74 respectively.
To address the question of how similar the various
exposures layers are, we compute the so-called link-
overlap by calculating the Jaccard coefficient Jαβ (see
appendix B 1) between two different layers α and β for
all possible pairs of layers. Furthermore, we compute the
correlation coefficients between exposures (weighted in-
degrees, kj =
∑
i L
α
ij), liabilities (weighted out-degrees,
ki =
∑
j L
α
ij) and SR (DebtRank R
α
i ) for all banks, be-
tween all pairs of layers (see section III B). Results are
collected in table I. Correlation coefficients and the Jac-
card coefficient are computed for the multi-layer network
observed at one representative trading day, i.e. at Sep
30 2013. In appendix A we show the evolution of pair-
wise degree correlations from 2007 until 2013. The link-
overlap (blue) between all pairs is relatively small. To
test the significance of the observed link-overlap, we com-
pare it to a null-model. For the randomized null-model
we preserved the interbank assets or exposures of each
bank (weighted in-degrees of Lαij) and rewired the ex-
posure to a random bank, similar to the method used
by Maslov and Sneppen [54]. Rewiring the interbank
exposure to a random counterparty means that the lia-
bilities (weighted out-degrees of Lαij) are not preserved.
Therefore total assets and equity capital of each bank re-
main unchanged. Note that it is not possible to preserve
(weighted) in- and out-degree at the same time. We find
that the link-overlap practically coincides with the null-
model, meaning that if banks have business relations in
one market it is not more likely that they also interact in
other markets. Only the link-overlap between derivatives
and foreign exchange show slightly higher levels than the
null-model, indicating that if two banks have exposure in
securities the probability to have one in FX is marginally
8higher than in the null-model.
High correlation coefficients ρexpα,β (see appendix B 2)
between total exposures of banks indicate that banks
that have high (low) exposure in layer α have also high
(low) exposure in layer β. Correlation coefficients ρexpα,β
close to zero mean that total exposures of banks are not
correlated in layer α and β. The correlations for liabil-
ities of banks ρliabα,β and ρ
R
α,β are interpreted in the same
way. We find in table I that ρexpα,β is close to zero for the
pair (derivatives : securities), meaning that they are al-
most uncorrelated. We find negative correlations for the
layer (securities : FX), meaning that exposures that are
high in securities imply small exposures in FX and vice
versa. Correlations for liabilities ρliabα,β are high for the
pairs (derivatives : securities), (derivatives : FX) and
(securities : FX), and low for (DL : derivatives) and (DL
: FX). Compared to the null-model, correlation coeffi-
cients ρexpα,β for all pairs are significant, with the single
exception of the pair (derivatives : FX). Here ρexpα,β co-
incides with the null-model. Correlations for liabilities
ρliabα,β are significant for the pairs (derivatives : securi-
ties), (derivatives : FX) and (securities : FX). Finally,
the correlation of SR at the bank level is ρRα,β > 0.5 for
all pairs except for (derivatives : securities) and (secu-
rities : FX), where correlations are small. These latter
pairs are different in the sense that their total exposures
and systemic impact are practically uncorrelated. All the
others layers are strongly correlated. Note that we can-
not compare correlation results of SR at the bank level
with the null-model because it is impossible to preserve
(weighted) in- and out-degrees at the same time.
B. Quantification of Systemic Risk in the Mexican
banking system
Figure 3(a) shows the SR-profile for the combined ex-
posures Rcombi (line) and stacked for different layers Rˆ
α
i
(colored bars) for Sept 30 2013. Clearly, individual banks
have different SR contributions from the different layers,
reflecting their different trading strategies. A number
of smaller banks have systemic impact in the securities
market only. The SR contribution from the interbank
(deposits and loans) and the derivative markets is clearly
smaller than the contributions from the foreign exchange
and securities markets. The systemic impact of the com-
bined layers (line) is always larger than the sum of the
layers separately, Rcombi >
∑
α Rˆ
α
i .
Figure 3(b) shows the daily average DebtRank R¯ from
Jan 2007-Mar 2013 for the different layers (stacked) and
from the combined networks (line). As in fig. 3(a) the
combined systemic impact is always larger than the com-
bination of all layers separately. Note that the com-
bined average DebtRank R¯comb increases about 50% from
roughly 1.7 before the financial crisis of 2007-2008 to
about 2.6 in 2013. The contributions of the individual
exposure types are more or less constant over time. The
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FIG. 3. (a) SR profile for the different layers. Normalized
DebtRank Rˆαi (see section III B) from different layers are
stacked for each bank. Banks are ordered according to their
DebtRank in the combined network from all layers (line). (b)
Time series for the average DebtRank R¯α(t) = 1
b
∑b
i=1 Rˆ
α
i (t)
for all layers from Jan 2 2007 to May 30 2013. The black
line shows the average DebtRank for all layers combined
R¯comb(t) = 1
b
∑b
i=1R
comb
i (t).
interbank (deposits and loans) and derivative markets
have smaller average DebtRank contributions than for-
eign exchange or securities. The derivatives market is
gaining importance in Mexico after 2009. Note the rel-
ative SR increase of securities at the beginning of the
subprime crisis (Dec 2007) and the subsequent decrease
shortly before the collapse of Lehman Brothers. There
is a marked peak in foreign exchange exposure two days
after Lehman Brothers filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection.
Figure 4 shows the daily development of ELsyst for
Mexico from 2007-2013. In Mexico there are no CDS
9time
EL
sy
st
 
[$/
ye
ar]
 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 20130
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4 x 10
11
ELsyst [$/year]
^MXGV5YUSAC
^VIX
Lehman Brothers collapse
Uncertainty about the rescue of Greece
International alarm over Eurozone crisis
Loss on derivatives of Mexican companies
Subprime crisis
Mexican GDP fell by more than 10%
FIG. 4. Expected systemic losses ELsyst in Mex$ per year, in comparison to the volatility index VIX and the CDS spreads
of 5-year Mexican government bonds in USD (MXGV5YUSAC). To allow comparison the MXGV5YUSAC and the VIX are
scaled such that the data points coincide on January 1, 2007. Several historical events are marked. Market based indices relax
fast to pre-crisis levels, whereas ELsyst does not, indicating that the expected systemic losses are indeed driven to a large extent
by network topology, and are consistently underestimated by the market. Expected losses in 2013 are about four times higher
than before the crisis.
spreads of banks available and ratings are only made
available for the purpose of issuing securities by banks.
This makes it difficult to derive individual default prob-
abilities for banks. As an alternative we approximate
the default probabilities for banks with sovereign default
probabilities. Typically banks’ strategies involve having
a rating no better than the sovereign where they are reg-
istered. In general, Mexican banks are well-capitalized,
especially the large subsidiaries of foreign banks. It is for
this reason that we believe it is justifiable to use sovereign
default probabilities as a proxy for all banks. As a ref-
erence we use the 5-year Mexican government bonds in
USD (MXGV5YUSAC) and assume a 40% recovery rate,
which is the standard market convention for the quota-
tion of CDS contracts. The short-term volatility of the
expected loss is mainly driven by international events.
As is the case with other credit risk models, for exam-
ple models for credit default swaps [55, 56], we assume
that default events and recovery rates are mutually inde-
pendent. In fig. 4 we highlight several historical events
and show the volatility index VIX and the CDS spreads
scaled such that the data points coincide on January 1,
2007. We see that both the volatility index and the CDS
spreads return quickly to pre-crisis levels, whereas ELsyst
clearly does not. This indicates that markets drastically
underestimate SR in the system – the expected systemic
losses in 2013 are about a factor four higher than before
the crisis.
In fig. 5 we compare the marginal contribution of indi-
vidual exposures on SR and credit risk. Everyone of the
ca. 500,000 individual exposures between banks across
the entire time period is represented by a data point.
The different layers are distinguished by colors. We im-
mediately observe that ∆ELsyst > ∆ELcredit for the vast
majority of transactions. We made sure that this find-
ing could not be explained by the exposure size relative
to equity capital, or by capital ratios (not shown). This
clearly demonstrates that marginal contributions from
individual liabilities depend not only on the two involved
parties, but also on the conditions of all nodes in the
network. Note that small and medium-size liabilities can
have SR contributions that vary by three orders of magni-
tude. Deposits and loans and derivatives show the low-
est variability, whereas for foreign exchange it is a bit
higher. Derivatives show clusters of transactions with
particularly high SR contributions for the corresponding
liability size. Exposures from securities cross-holdings
have the highest contributions to SR.
Note that in some cases ∆ELsyst < ∆ELcredit, meaning
that a few exposures have a SR reducing effect on the
network. Although counterintuitive, removing a link can
change the topology of a network in a way that overall
SR increases even if the total exposure of the systems is
decreased.
To exclude the possibility that this effect arises as an
artifact of the measure we conducted computer simula-
tions with the model introduced in Poledna and Thurner
[30]. We modified (eq. (7)) to always predict an increase
of SR equal or larger to the overall increase of exposure
in the system, i.e.
∆′ELsyst = max
(
∆ELsyst,∆ELcredit
)
. (8)
In computer simulations we used (eq. (7)) and (eq. (8))
to estimate the increase of SR in the simulated financial
system. Results indicate that the unmodified version of
eq. (7) predicts losses due to SR slightly better than the
modified version.
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FIG. 5. Marginal increase of expected systemic loss, ∆ELsyst,
versus increase of credit risk, ∆ELcredit, for individual expo-
sures between institutions. Every data point represents an
individual interbank liability Lαij on a given layer and given
day. Data is aggregated from all banks over all days from Jan
2 2007 to May 30 2013. Exposures/liabilities lower than 10M
Mex$ are not shown. Note that ∆ELsyst > ∆ELcredit mean-
ing that defaults of exposures do not only affect the ‘lending’
party but involves third parties.
VI. CONCLUSION
To a large extent SR is related to the topologies of
a collection of financial exposure networks (multi-layer
network). This work provides, to our knowledge, the
first complete empirical picture of network-based SR in a
national, system-wide context. By analyzing SR contri-
butions from four exposure layers of the interbank net-
work (derivatives, securities cross-holdings, foreign ex-
change and the interbank market of deposits and loans)
we show that by relying on the single layer of deposits
and loans – as done in previous studies – one drastically
underestimates SR in the system, missing about 90% of
the total SR. We demonstrate that the exposures related
to the cross-holding of securities and the exposures aris-
ing from FX transactions are crucially important compo-
nents of the SR in a country. These exposures are almost
never taken into consideration as part of contagion stud-
ies, when in fact they need to be included in order to
provide a more complete picture of the risks faced by the
financial system.
On a national level we suggest a SR-profile that cap-
tures the SR contributions from all financial institu-
tions in a country across the various exposure layers.
It is straightforward to use the SR profile to introduce
a system-wide systemic risk measure, i.e. the average
DebtRank, which takes all exposure layers into account.
The average DebtRank captures the contribution of the
various network topologies and can be computed on a
daily scale. Interestingly, SR of the combined exposure
network is higher (increasingly so over time) than the
sum of SR from the four layers. This points to the non-
linearity of the definition of the systemic risk measure.
The root cause for this non-linearity is the propagation
of shocks to financial institutions between the layers. For
example, a loss from trading derivatives can spill over to
other market. This non-linear effect was seen in a differ-
ent context before in Montagna and Kok [50]. If finan-
cial institutions were restricted to a particular segment
of the market, e.g. some investment banks only trading
securities, while other banks only engage in interbank
lending, the non-linearity in the aggregation of the layers
would disappear. This evidence could provide a further
argument for a structural reform of the banking system,
aiming at a separation or restriction of certain trading
activities as suggested in several proposals [57, 58]. Al-
though the idea of these proposals is to ring-fence deposit
banks to safeguard against riskier banking activities, we
believe that a structural separation of trading actives to
separate legal entities would also reduce SR in general.
The DebtRank, in combination with estimates of de-
fault probabilities of institutions, allows us to define a
novel index, ELsyst, the expected systemic losses within a
financial economy. The index quantifies the total losses
of a potential cascading event at any point in time, pro-
vided that no bail-outs are taking place at that time.
This makes it possible to quantify the costs originating
from SR in Pesos/Euros/Dollars per year, provided that
governments would not employ a resolution mechanism
(such as a bail out) for troubled banks. The expected sys-
temic loss further enables us to compare expected costs
for bailouts with the expected systemic loss, so that deci-
sions for bailouts can be based on quantitative, transpar-
ent and rational grounds. Finally, the expected systemic
loss ELsyst can be used to compare economies, and indi-
cate the SR-reducing performance of policy interventions.
We find that financial markets systematically underes-
timate SR. When we compare the expected systemic loss
with the volatility index (VIX) and the CDS spreads of
5-year Mexican government bonds, it becomes clear that
expected systemic loss follows several features of these
market risk indicators. However, while the VIX returned
to pre-crisis levels, and the spreads have doubled since the
crisis, the expected systemic loss has quadrupled since
2007. This means that the potential direct costs for a
cascading failure in Mexico would be four times higher
now than before the crisis.
In recent years various studies using multiplex network
analysis have demonstrated that the understanding of a
system by a single network layer can lead to a fundamen-
tally wrong understanding of the entire system, and that
the dynamics of multiplex systems can be very differ-
ent from single layer networks [34–36]. The multi-layer
analysis of financial networks points in a similar direc-
tion, namely that there might be much higher SR levels
present in the financial system than previously antici-
pated, or than markets assume. There are two reasons
why we still might underestimate SR. First, we do not
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include other potentially important sources of contagion,
such as the network of overlapping portfolios and funding
liquidity risk. The inclusion of more network layers is the
subject of future studies. Second, in this work we assume
that default events and recovery rates are mutually inde-
pendent, which does not hold in practice for a number of
reasons. In conclusion, true values of SR might be still
significantly higher.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The views expressed here are those of the authors and
do not represent the views of De Nederlandsche Bank,
Banco de Me´xico or the Financial Stability Directorate.
We thank B. Fuchs, C. Chrysanthakopoulos and A. Wan-
jek for help with the manuscript. We acknowledge finan-
cial support from EC FP7 projects CRISIS, agreement
no. 288501 (65%), LASAGNE, agreement no. 318132
(15%) and MULTIPLEX, agreement no. 317532 (20%).
Appendix A: Classical network statistics
In this section, we present classical network statistics
for each of the layers, as well as for the combination of all
layers. In table II, we present the evolution of densities of
different layers and the correlations between the degrees
and weights of nodes across different pairs of layers. Val-
ues are presented as an annual average from 2007 until
2013.
In the first part of table II, we show the evolution of
network density for all layers combined as well as for
each individual layer. Densities for the derivatives layer,
deposits and loans and FX remain stable from 2007 to
2013. Densities of the securities layer and for all layers
combined increase every year in the observation period.
In the second part of table II, we show the evolution
of degree correlations between layers. For every pair of
layers we show the degree correlation (All), the in-degree
correlation (In) and the out-degree correlation (Out). It
is important to distinguish between incoming and out-
going links because they have a different economic inter-
pretation. The former can be thought of as a form of
funding or trust relationship that many banks have with
one bank; the latter is related to the concept of exposure.
The third part of table II, shows the evolution of weight
correlations between layers. For every pair of layers we
show the weight correlation (All), the in-weight correla-
tion (In) and the out-weight correlation (Out).
An extensive display of stylized facts of the Mexi-
can banking system network can be found in Mart´ınez-
Jaramillo et al. [33]. A more in-depth multiplex empirical
analysis for a database similar to the one used here can
be found in Molina-Borboa et al. [59].
Appendix B: Multiplex network analysis
Given the multiplex network Lαij(t) several measures
can be computed.
1. Jaccard coefficient
The Jaccard coefficient quantifies the similarity be-
tween two networks by measuring the tendency to have
links present in both networks simultaneously. Jαβ is a
similarity score between two sets of elements and is de-
fined as the size of the intersection of the sets divided by
the size of their union,
Jαβ ≡ |α ∩ β|/|α ∪ β| . (B1)
2. Correlation coefficient
For two random variablesX and Y with mean values X¯
and Y¯ , and standard deviations σX and σY , respectively,
the correlation coefficient ρX,Y is defined as
ρX,Y =
E[(X − X¯)(Y − Y¯ )]
σXσY
∈ [−1, 1] . (B2)
Appendix C: DebtRank
DebtRank is a recursive method suggested in Battiston
et al. [29] to determine the systemic relevance of nodes in
financial networks. It is a number measuring the fraction
of the total economic value in the network that is poten-
tially affected by a node or a set of nodes. Lij denotes the
interbank liability network at any given moment (loans
of bank j to bank i), and Ci is the capital of bank i. If
bank i defaults and cannot repay its loans, bank j loses
the loans Lij . If j does not have enough capital available
to cover the loss, j also defaults. The impact of bank i
on bank j (in case of a default of i) is therefore defined
as
Wij = min
[
1,
Lij
Cj
]
. (C1)
The value of the impact of bank i on its neighbors is
Ii =
∑
jWijvj . The impact is measured by the economic
value vi of bank i. For the economic value we use two
different proxies. Given the total outstanding interbank
exposures of bank i, Li =
∑
j Lji, its economic value is
defined as
vi = Li/
∑
j
Lj . (C2)
Alternatively, in order to also include non interbank as-
sets, the economic value can be defined as
vi = (Li + r
lossAtoti )/
∑
j
(Lj + r
lossAtotj ) , (C3)
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2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Density
DL 0.062(4) 0.064(3) 0.062(2) 0.063(4) 0.075(3) 0.074(3) 0.076(3)
FX 0.064(5) 0.06(2) 0.06(2) 0.08(2) 0.07(1) 0.08(2) 0.08(1)
secu 0.02(1) 0.029(3) 0.029(3) 0.039(6) 0.06(5) 0.068(4) 0.07(6)
deri 0.1(1) 0.09(2) 0.09(2) 0.11(1) 0.098(8) 0.098(8) 0.098(10)
comb 0.21(1) 0.25(2) 0.24(2) 0.28(2) 0.32(2) 0.33(1) 0.34(1)
Pair-wise degree correlation
DL:Secu All 0.68(7) 0.68(5) 0.63(6) 0.61(5) 0.64(4) 0.59(4) 0.51(4)
In 0.46(8) 0.49(8) 0.43(8) 0.42(8) 0.49(5) 0.46(6) 0.38(6)
Out 0.53(7) 0.58(6) 0.49(8) 0.46(6) 0.49(4) 0.36(6) 0.31(4)
DL:FX All 0.54(6) 0.47(7) 0.39(6) 0.4(6) 0.35(6) 0.36(7) 0.38(7)
In 0.49(6) 0.4(7) 0.38(7) 0.4(6) 0.36(6) 0.37(7) 0.39(7)
Out 0.45(6) 0.35(8) 0.17(6) 0.21(6) 0.17(7) 0.15(6) 0.17(6)
DL:Deri All 0.32(5) 0.24(7) 0.2(8) 0.13(5) 0.25(7) 0.29(6) 0.27(7)
In 0.24(6) 0.19(6) 0.25(8) 0.2(6) 0.34(7) 0.35(7) 0.35(7)
Out 0.2(5) 0.11(7) 0(6) -0.04(4) 0.13(7) 0.1(5) 0.08(6)
Secu:FX All 0.68(7) 0.56(6) 0.52(8) 0.53(7) 0.49(5) 0.46(5) 0.46(6)
In 0.53(8) 0.46(7) 0.46(6) 0.49(8) 0.45(7) 0.4(7) 0.35(7)
Out 0.56(8) 0.5(6) 0.3(1) 0.32(7) 0.33(7) 0.29(6) 0.33(6)
Secu:Deri All 0.49(7) 0.47(7) 0.4(1) 0.24(5) 0.32(5) 0.3(5) 0.2(6)
In 0.48(7) 0.41(9) 0.5(1) 0.24(5) 0.44(8) 0.5(5) 0.35(9)
Out 0.27(7) 0.32(7) 0.22(8) 0.13(6) 0.17(8) 0.04(5) 0.03(6)
FX:Deri All 0.7(5) 0.6(7) 0.57(7) 0.51(5) 0.57(6) 0.57(5) 0.58(6)
In 0.66(6) 0.57(8) 0.57(7) 0.51(6) 0.59(7) 0.6(7) 0.59(7)
Out 0.67(6) 0.58(6) 0.54(7) 0.48(6) 0.58(6) 0.56(6) 0.58(7)
Pair-wise weight correlation
DL:Secu All 0.7(2) 0.79(9) 0.8(1) 0.7(1) 0.8(1) 0.78(8) 0.6(1)
In 0.6(3) 0.7(2) 0.7(2) 0.4(2) 0.6(2) 0.6(1) 0.4(1)
Out 0.4(2) 0.4(2) 0.4(3) 0.6(2) 0.6(2) 0.7(1) 0.6(1)
DL:FX All 0.6(2) 0.5(2) 0.7(2) 0.5(2) 0.5(1) 0.5(2) 0.4(1)
In 0.5(2) 0.5(2) 0.6(2) 0.5(2) 0.5(2) 0.5(2) 0.4(2)
Out 0.5(2) 0.4(2) 0.4(2) 0.3(2) 0.3(2) 0.3(2) 0.3(2)
DL:Deri All 0.82(9) 0.7(1) 0.69(9) 0.6(2) 0.62(9) 0.54(7) 0.59(9)
In 0.6(2) 0.6(1) 0.5(2) 0.5(2) 0.7(2) 0.5(1) 0.4(2)
Out 0.6(2) 0.4(2) 0.4(2) 0.3(2) 0.2(1) 0.2(1) 0.2(1)
Secu:FX All 0.5(2) 0.5(1) 0.6(2) 0.56(10) 0.5(1) 0.4(1) 0.3(1)
In 0.5(2) 0.5(2) 0.7(2) 0.7(1) 0.6(1) 0.5(1) 0.5(1)
Out 0.3(2) 0.2(1) 0.2(2) 0.09(8) 0.09(9) 0.03(10) 0.03(7)
Secu:Deri All 0.6(2) 0.6(1) 0.68(10) 0.63(8) 0.67(7) 0.54(3) 0.4(1)
In 0.6(2) 0.7(1) 0.6(1) 0.7(2) 0.8(2) 0.88(4) 0.8(1)
Out 0.4(2) 0.3(1) 0.08(5) 0.06(3) 0.08(5) -0.02(4) 0.05(5)
FX:Deri All 0.8(1) 0.7(1) 0.7(1) 0.7(1) 0.7(1) 0.7(1) 0.78(8)
In 0.7(2) 0.6(2) 0.5(2) 0.6(2) 0.6(2) 0.5(2) 0.6(1)
Out 0.6(1) 0.6(2) 0.6(1) 0.6(2) 0.6(1) 0.6(1) 0.7(1)
TABLE II. Classical network statistics for the multi-layer network. In the first part we show the evolution of network density
for all layers combined, as well as for each individual layer. In the second part we show the pair-wise degree correlation and in
the third part the pair-wise weight correlation. Values are presented as an annual average from 2007 until 2013. The number
in parentheses is the standard deviation referred to the corresponding last digits of the quoted result.
with Atoti as total assets excluding interbank assets of
bank i and a constant loss rate given default rloss = 0.6
for non interbank assets. To take into account the im-
pact of nodes at distance two and higher, it has to be
computed recursively. If the network Wij contains cycles
the impact can exceed one. To avoid this problem an
alternative was suggested in Battiston et al. [29], where
two state variables, hi(t) and si(t), are assigned to each
node. hi is a continuous variable between zero and one; si
is a discrete state variable for three possible states, undis-
tressed, distressed, and inactive, si ∈ {U,D, I}. The ini-
tial conditions are hi(1) = Ψ ,∀i ∈ S; hi(1) = 0 ,∀i 6∈ S,
and si(1) = D , ∀i ∈ S; si(1) = U ,∀i 6∈ S (parameter
Ψ quantifies the initial level of distress: Ψ ∈ [0, 1], with
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Ψ = 1 meaning default). The dynamics of hi is then
specified by
hi(t) = min
1, hi(t− 1) + ∑
j|sj(t−1)=D
Wjihj(t− 1)
 .
(C4)
The sum extends over these j, for which sj(t− 1) = D,
si(t) =

D if hi(t) > 0; si(t− 1) 6= I,
I if si(t− 1) = D,
si(t− 1) otherwise .
(C5)
The DebtRank of the set S (set of nodes in distress at
time 1), is R′S =
∑
j hj(T )vj−
∑
j hj(1)vj , and measures
the distress in the system, excluding the initial distress.
If S is a single node, the DebtRank measures its systemic
impact on the network. The DebtRank of S containing
only the single node i is
R′i =
∑
j
hj(T )vj − hi(1)vi . (C6)
The DebtRank, as defined in eq. (C6), excludes the loss
generated directly by the default of the node itself and
measures only the impact on the rest of the system
through default contagion. For some purposes, however,
it is useful to include the direct loss of a default of i
as well. The total loss caused by the set of nodes S in
distress at time 1, including the initial distress is
RS =
∑
j
hj(T )vj . (C7)
Appendix D: Derivation of a practical
approximation for the expected systemic loss
Equation (3) is only practical for situations with less
than about 20−30 financial institutions. Computing the
power set and calculating DebtRanks for all possible com-
binations of more than 30 financial institutions in a large
financial networks is practically unfeasible. If the default
probabilities are low (pi  1) or the interconnectedness
is low (Ri ≈ vi), RS can be approximated by
RS ≈
∑
i∈S
Ri . (D1)
In an unconnected or unleveraged financial system (Ri =
vi), RS is exactly equal to
∑
i∈S Ri. If pi  1, the first
terms of eq. (3) (with only one node initially in distress)
contribute more to the final result. Thus the approxima-
tion eq. (D1) has only a minor impact on the final result.
Typically, pi  1 or Ri ≈ vi holds in real word financial
networks. With the approximation eq. (D1), eq. (4) can
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FIG. 6. Approximation for ELsyst in comparison to the exact
result given by eq. (3). To allow computation in reasonable
time we consider only the 15 largest Mexican banks. The
approximation of eq. (4) is shown in red (dashed). The ap-
proximation is generally higher than the exact result (blue
line). The deviation is on average less than 0.65% and not
more than 3.5%.
be derived from eq. (3) by
ELsyst ≈ V
∑
S∈P(B)
∏
i∈S
pi
∏
j∈B\S
(1− pj)
(∑
i∈S
Ri
)
(D2)
= V
b∑
i=1
 ∑
J∈P(B\{i})
∏
j∈J
pj
∏
k∈B\(J∪{i})
(1− pk)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
piRi
(D3)
= V
b∑
i=1
piRi . (D4)
The term in brackets in eq. (D3) sums to 1 (proof by
induction). Equation (D4) is used as eq. (4) in the main
text. This approximation is practical for large financial
networks.
We test the quality of the approximation for ELsyst
with respect to the exact result given in eq. (3). In
fig. 6 we show the exact result for ELsyst considering only
the 15 largest Mexican banks (blue line), which can still
be computed in reasonable time. The approximation of
eq. (4) is shown in red (dashed). The approximation is
generally higher than the exact result (on average less
than 0.65%). The maximum deviation is 3.5%.
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